Faking injuries in a winning 4th quarter? Iran at the precipice.
So, who’s up for another round of graphs showing that Western diplomacy, sanctions, and technology have yet to out-maneuver Iran in the mullahs’ push for a bomb?
A long-time IAEA expert, Olli Heinonen, predicted this past week that, using her newer, advanced centrifuges, Iran could produce enough high-enriched uranium (HEU) for a first nuclear warhead in as little as two weeks from making the decision to go for the “breakout.” (See here also.)
For clarity, this does not mean Iran is “two weeks from a bomb.” It means that once Iran decides to take the final enrichment step, it could take as little as two weeks Continue reading “Yet another reminder: Iran still closing in on bomb”
Enrichment versus weaponization.
We have reached a crucial juncture in the progress of the Iranian nuclear-weapons program – and the nature and significance of that juncture are being overlooked in favor of focusing on the reported effects of the Stuxnet worm and international sanctions.
The juncture in question is defined by two factors: Iran’s mastery of the uranium-enrichment process, and her successful testing of missiles that could deliver a nuclear warhead. Iran has produced enough low-enriched uranium (LEU) for 3-4 nuclear warheads. The LEU requires enrichment to a higher level of purity to be used in a warhead, and Iran has already started on that process. Enriching uranium to “medium” purity Continue reading “Iran: Not So Fast with the Mission Accomplished Banner”
Wasn’t very effective against Iran.
It’s early days yet to be making pronouncements about the Stuxnet worm, which appears to have been developed by someone’s national agency(ies) to attack the Siemens-manufactured computerized control systems (and only the Siemens systems) of large industrial plants, electric power plants, or factories. That isn’t stopping the MSM from running with the story that a nation (us? Israel?) developed Stuxnet to attack Iran’s Bushehr reactor.
A few observations as we move forward on this. More information may or may not become available, depending on who did, in fact, develop this thing and why.
First, and most important, if what we’ve been told so far is the extent of what Stuxnet does, it isn’t a very effective tool for sabotaging Iran’s nuclear program. Continue reading “Stuxnet: Observations on a Worm; UPDATED 26 Sept”