The IT role in Russiagate: Part III – Internet maneuvers, an Obama-linked trust group, and DARPA

Information maneuvers in the dark.

Part I is here.  Part II is here.

Part II concluded with a discussion of Rodney Joffe’s private ISP, an arrangement he spoke of himself in a June 2015 PR release on an award from the tech organization Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group (M3AAWG).

Part III continues with a listen to the echoes of the Conficker worm (a high-profile project for Rodney Joffe); a most remarkably-timed formation of a new trust group with extensive Obama links – and one link in particular to the 2016 DNC intrusion; and the link – because of course there is one – to the DARPA project John Durham is investigating Georgia Tech’s participation in.

Previous plot outline?

One penultimate set of facts sheds some clarifying light on what we’ve tallied up already.  It relates to Rodney Joffe’s participation in the IT working group Continue reading “The IT role in Russiagate: Part III – Internet maneuvers, an Obama-linked trust group, and DARPA”

The IT role in Russiagate: Part II – “Trust,” those pesky years 2015 and 2016, and new Georgia Tech dots that connect

Trust; but verify.

Part I is here.  (Part III is here.)  Part II, in this article, was planned originally.  There is now a Part III, which I will post separately but simultaneously.  Separating Parts II and III is principally about limiting the size and number of images in each article.

Key points for Parts II and III:

  • Features of Ops-Trust “trust group” model are significant to assessing Joffe and Georgia Tech roles in Alfa-gate
  • A different industry group (M3AAWG), which functions in some ways as a trust group, has links to multiple Alfa-gate actors
  • One of those is Listrak, suggesting a reason to probe how contract with Cendyn and exploitation by Joffe team came about
  • Rodney Joffe was using a private ISP he controlled for over a decade, including in 2016-2017
  • Several of same players (including Joffe and Georgia Tech) involved in Conficker worm working group in 2009; interesting pattern of features
  • New non-profit for cybersecurity was started by Obama-linked experts near end of his term and joined M3AAWG in May 2016
  • Georgia Tech involvement in DARPA research project (reported on 10 March) is about a key principle uniquely associated with CrowdStrike conclusions on DNC intrusion – and grant solicitations were announced in April 2016

Continue reading “The IT role in Russiagate: Part II – “Trust,” those pesky years 2015 and 2016, and new Georgia Tech dots that connect”

The IT role in Russiagate: Part I – Taking (brief) stock with graphics

The, er, graphic novel on the IT plot in Spygate/Russiagate.

[Links to Parts II and III at the bottom. – J.E.]

This article started out to be a somewhat different one, developing a couple of points about the monitoring of EOP (Executive Office of the President) communications referenced in the John Durham court filings.

But with a firehose of new information coming in, it seems necessary to take stock and put in perspective the things we know up to this point.  I don’t think most will find it a waste of time.  The stock-taking is relatively short, and the principal feature is something we haven’t had yet:  schematic diagrams of how the major IT pieces fit together to make the surveillance of “Trump” possible, and facilitate the concoction of an anti-Trump narrative about supposed links to Russia.

The graphics are very simplified, which I suspect many readers will consider a blessing.  My hope is to spare some unnecessary efforts to sort out confusion when it need not be at work. Continue reading “The IT role in Russiagate: Part I – Taking (brief) stock with graphics”

And there it is: Important distinction regarding the surveillance at issue in the Sussmann case

It takes an EOP to compile a dossier.

UPDATE as this goes to post.

There was no guarantee we’d get lucky and see a specific instance of the “surveillance melding” referred to below in the original article – a theme I have discussed at length since 2017.  (What I call “surveillance melding” here is about someone in a position to monitor data streams from multiple intelligence sources using them in company, to spy on and develop specific targets individually and in depth.)

But we did get lucky, due to the sharp eyes of some of our excellent Internet sleuths.  In this case, Margot Cleveland pulled this nugget from a new tranche of emails among the team assembled by Rodney Joffe in 2016 for the DNS lookups caper: Continue reading “And there it is: Important distinction regarding the surveillance at issue in the Sussmann case”