A rogue SCIF at a law firm? Examining the latest report about the FBI and Perkins Coie; UPDATE: FBI weighs in

The more tangled the web, the more law firms there’ll be.

[See update at the bottom – J.E.]

On Tuesday, Tucker Carlson had a brief segment with Rep. Matt Gaetz to discuss information Gaetz and Rep. Jim Jordan received recently from a “whistleblower.”  The gist of the information is that since 2012, the FBI has maintained a “secure work environment” at the Perkins Coie law firm. (H/t: Conservative Treehouse; video below.)

From Gaetz’s comments, it sounds as if Michael Sussmann, formerly a partner at Perkins Coie (before his indictment in the Durham investigation, for which charge Sussmann was acquitted by a jury on Tuesday), administered the secure work environment until he left the firm in 2021.

Sundance speculates at CTH that the secure work environment at Perkins Coie is where (or perhaps one of the “wheres”) people were gaining unauthorized access to unminimized (i.e., not “masked”) U.S. person identifying information (USPI), as described in the FISA court summary by Judge Rosemary Collyer released in 2017. Continue reading “A rogue SCIF at a law firm? Examining the latest report about the FBI and Perkins Coie; UPDATE: FBI weighs in”

The foreign intel angle on Spygate: What probably didn’t happen, and what probably did

A history of “knowing” things that never led anywhere.

This should more properly be titled “A slice of the foreign intel angle on Spygate,” because it’s not a comprehensive survey.  Such a survey would at a minimum have to include British, Australian, and Italian involvement in human intelligence (HUMINT) threads, among others.  The survey here isn’t that expansive.

Rather, it separates out a chunk of the purported information to date on one part of the larger story line.  The part in question is a combination of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and Russian intelligence, and in particular, U.S. and friendly intelligence on Russian intelligence.  The latter – or at least claims about the latter; i.e., claims about our intel on Russian intel – played a key role in perpetuating the Russiagate narrative when it was looking particularly seedy and ill-starred.

In retrospect, it appears skepticism about some claims of foreign-intel sourcing was always in order. Continue reading “The foreign intel angle on Spygate: What probably didn’t happen, and what probably did”

The importance of background, and Danchenko’s primary Russian sub-source

A key to the thematic history behind Spygate.

In the TOC Ready Room preview for this article, I alluded to the principal point of highlighting the information in it.  That point is that Spygate was not a pick-up-game reaction to events in 2016.  In terms of involvement by the Obama federal agencies and Hillary Clinton’s network, evidence of connections to prior motives and preparation abounds.

Examples include Alexandra Chalupa and a cast of Obama officials already seeking Ukrainian cooperation on a Manafort-focused narrative in January 2016, before Manafort joined the Trump campaign and before the first primary election had been held.  If this was about impugning Manafort, why?  By 2019 we could see that getting ahead of any bad news about Biden was an obvious motive – but was it a priority at that point, considering Biden wasn’t running in 2016?  Did Republicans in general know enough about the Biden shenanigans to create a pervasive problem for Hillary and other Democrats that year?

Something other than narrowly-focused, proximate reactions seems to have been going on. Continue reading “The importance of background, and Danchenko’s primary Russian sub-source”