Ongoing: Five top-level pings on the Russiagate/Spygate maneuver war

Occupying the position they are compelled to attack us in.

We recently passed the five-year mark of the public breaking of the Russiagaet/Spygate saga (which I reckon to the day the Steele dossier burst forth upon us, 10 January 2017), and a brief stock-taking is in order.

To keep these points crisply punctuated, they will be brief.  This is an overview, not an in-depth treatment. 

I include here the points I consider essential to useful analysis of the “-gates.”  There is a very great deal more that can be said, but these are the points that keep us on track.

Ping One Continue reading “Ongoing: Five top-level pings on the Russiagate/Spygate maneuver war”

The foreign intel angle on Spygate: What probably didn’t happen, and what probably did

A history of “knowing” things that never led anywhere.

This should more properly be titled “A slice of the foreign intel angle on Spygate,” because it’s not a comprehensive survey.  Such a survey would at a minimum have to include British, Australian, and Italian involvement in human intelligence (HUMINT) threads, among others.  The survey here isn’t that expansive.

Rather, it separates out a chunk of the purported information to date on one part of the larger story line.  The part in question is a combination of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and Russian intelligence, and in particular, U.S. and friendly intelligence on Russian intelligence.  The latter – or at least claims about the latter; i.e., claims about our intel on Russian intel – played a key role in perpetuating the Russiagate narrative when it was looking particularly seedy and ill-starred.

In retrospect, it appears skepticism about some claims of foreign-intel sourcing was always in order. Continue reading “The foreign intel angle on Spygate: What probably didn’t happen, and what probably did”

TOC Ready Room 10 March 2022: NFZs, convoys, and Iran follies, oh my

What’s wrong and right with the world; Russia-, Ukraine-, and Iran-wise.

Keeping it short and sweet for now, as things keep updating on the long-running Phase II of the “IT in Russiagate” topic.  The first subject in today’s Ready Room grab-bag is the no-fly zone proposal for Ukraine.

It’s a bad idea.  All I will do here is copy in an email sent earlier with my reflections on the matter.  They were forwarded in response to a piece by former Senator Joe Lieberman in the Wall Street Journal (apologies for the paywall).

The email text: Continue reading “TOC Ready Room 10 March 2022: NFZs, convoys, and Iran follies, oh my”

The IT role in Russiagate: Part I – Taking (brief) stock with graphics

The, er, graphic novel on the IT plot in Spygate/Russiagate.

[Links to Parts II and III at the bottom. – J.E.]

This article started out to be a somewhat different one, developing a couple of points about the monitoring of EOP (Executive Office of the President) communications referenced in the John Durham court filings.

But with a firehose of new information coming in, it seems necessary to take stock and put in perspective the things we know up to this point.  I don’t think most will find it a waste of time.  The stock-taking is relatively short, and the principal feature is something we haven’t had yet:  schematic diagrams of how the major IT pieces fit together to make the surveillance of “Trump” possible, and facilitate the concoction of an anti-Trump narrative about supposed links to Russia.

The graphics are very simplified, which I suspect many readers will consider a blessing.  My hope is to spare some unnecessary efforts to sort out confusion when it need not be at work. Continue reading “The IT role in Russiagate: Part I – Taking (brief) stock with graphics”

And there it is: Important distinction regarding the surveillance at issue in the Sussmann case

It takes an EOP to compile a dossier.

UPDATE as this goes to post.

There was no guarantee we’d get lucky and see a specific instance of the “surveillance melding” referred to below in the original article – a theme I have discussed at length since 2017.  (What I call “surveillance melding” here is about someone in a position to monitor data streams from multiple intelligence sources using them in company, to spy on and develop specific targets individually and in depth.)

But we did get lucky, due to the sharp eyes of some of our excellent Internet sleuths.  In this case, Margot Cleveland pulled this nugget from a new tranche of emails among the team assembled by Rodney Joffe in 2016 for the DNS lookups caper: Continue reading “And there it is: Important distinction regarding the surveillance at issue in the Sussmann case”